NEBOSH IGC Solve Question Paper Task No 3

 

SCENARIO    

The warehouse

                           You are a newly-hired warehouse worker for the distribution organisation Miller-Oslo (MO). You work in one of their small warehouses with 14 other workers, including the warehouse manager (WM) and two supervisors. Goods weighing up to 1000kg are stored in sealed crates or stacked on pallets and then stretch wrapped. These are then stored on racking until required for shipment by distribution vehicles. There are two loading bays at the back of the warehouse, with floor ramps allowing goods to be loaded onto the vehicles by forklift trucks (FLTs). There is a small kitchen, rest area, toilets for workers, and two side offices - the larger office is the WM’s.

Entrance to the warehouse is by ID card access. There is an intercom system to ring for non-card holders. Visitors who are expected will be escorted while inside the building, and unexpected visitors are denied entrance. On your first day of employment the supervisor on duty gives you a quick tour of the building to start your induction. They make sure you know where the fire exits are before rushing you into the smaller office. Inside, you are seated in front of an old television (TV). Next to the TV is a collection of VHS video cassettes labelled: ‘Induction Part 1’; ‘Part 2 - Fire Safety’; ‘Part 3 - Manual Handling’; and ‘Part 4 - What to Do in an Emergency’. The supervisor leaves you alone while you watch the videos.

The videos appear to apply to all MO warehouses. You learn from the ‘What to do in an emergency’ video that the first-aid box is in reception. You think back to the tour of the building and do not remember seeing a reception area or first-aid box. You learn that personal pagers should be turned off during working hours, and that all accidents or near misses should be reported to your health and safety officer. The video happily states that the health and safety officer will teach you ‘everything you need to know’ about health and safety after the induction ends, and your specific warehouse’s health and safety policies and procedures.

The supervisor returns four hours later when you have finished watching the videos. They have a box of high visibility vests, hard hats and gloves, that you sort through to find your closest size. With the induction training complete, they give you an ID card then take you back into the warehouse for your job training. You cannot see any painted traffic lines on the ground separating the pedestrian path and FLT routes, as shown in the videos, so you ask the supervisor if the videos were incorrect. They sigh and tell you that the lines have needed repainting for a long time. You ask who the health and safety officer is and learn that the warehouse has been trying to hire someone for that position “for years”

Over the next week you are taught your job tasks by the other workers and become friendly with them. They teach you a few methods to save time, but they are not sure if these methods are causing overloading of the racking closest to the loading bay. Later that day you hear the WM shouting at an FLT driver for taking too long to load an order onto a delivery vehicle. The WM gives the FLT driver an immediate verbal warning for causing delays. You overhear the WM muttering that they will not let their reputation of keeping the warehouse ahead of schedule be ruined. The workers nearby whisper “avoid the WM because they only come out of their office when angry”. They also mention that this driver has not even been given time off to complete their FLT training.

The crash

Later that day, as you pass a loading bay you see an FLT speeding around the corner towards you. The driver notices you, panics and desperately tries to change direction. This driver is the one who was shouted at earlier. You jump back onto the loading bay ramp to avoid the FLT. You slip and twist your ankle. You fall to the ground screaming and your ankle swells painfully. The driver swerves the FLT away from the ramp, but the vehicle begins to tilt. They try to recover the situation but within seconds the FLT topples sideways into the nearby racking. The racking collapses and an avalanche of metal and pallets buries the driver.

A week later, after the warehouse has reopened, the workers call a meeting. You are on sick leave for your injured ankle but decide to attend. When you arrive, you hear shouting from the smaller office. The shouting does not stop as you enter, and you see all of the workers are there, except the FLT driver. Several people are having a loud argument with the WM. The WM notices you sitting down and resting your leg in an ankle brace on a chair. They sneer and point out that this meeting cannot be so important if the FLT driver cannot be ‘bothered’ to show up. The room goes silent. Everyone is horrified by the WM’s comments. One of the workers informs the WM that the FLT driver is in hospital. As a result of the accident they are in a coma and have a crushed skull. The WM finally stops arguing.

Your colleagues demand change. This was the worst accident so far and “cannot be ignored this time”. Eventually the WM reveals that MO are hiring a health and safety consultant to make recommendations for improvements. The WM then starts arguing again, blaming the FLT driver entirely for the accident. They claim this meeting is an excuse for everyone not to work and that they will never allow a worker-demanded meeting again

The health and safety consultant (HSC)

The HSC arrives two days later. They spend the first day talking with the WM and looking through paperwork. The next day the HSC gathers the workers and supervisors together, deliberately excluding the WM. They introduce them self, then explain that they will speak to everyone as a group to better understand the warehouse and workforce. They will also speak to everyone individually but assure them that conversations will be confidential.

The two supervisors welcome the HSC because “management might finally listen”. Everyone had been complaining about time pressure and safety concerns for months. They were ignored, so they stopped trying to talk to the WM about it. One of the supervisors says that they are meant to be taking a NEBOSH qualification on behalf of the warehouse, but they have repeatedly been refused time off to study. Another worker furiously recalls that the traffic route lines were meant to be repainted yearly, but the WM always cancelled it because the work would “cause delays”.

Task 3: Demonstrating management commitment 

Management commitment is an important part of health and safety culture. How effectively did the WM demonstrate commitment?

Note: You should support your answer, where applicable, using relevant information from the scenario.

Task 3: Demonstrating management commitment

The Warehouse Manager (WM) did not effectively demonstrate commitment to safety and health. Several aspects of the WM's behavior and actions in the scenario indicate a lack of commitment to safety:

1. Inadequate Induction Training: The WM allowed a new employee to undergo a subpar induction training process that lacked critical safety information specific to the warehouse. This demonstrates a lack of oversight and commitment to ensuring that employees receive proper safety training from the start.
2. Failure to Address Safety Concerns: The WM did not address concerns raised by workers, such as time pressure, inadequate training, and maintenance issues. Ignoring these concerns suggests a lack of concern for the safety and well-being of employees.
3. Pressure on Workers: The WM was observed pressuring an FLT driver to load an order quickly, which may have contributed to the accident. This action indicates a focus on productivity over safety.
4. Lack of Empathy: The WM's comments during the meeting, where they questioned the importance of the meeting due to the FLT driver's absence and made insensitive remarks about the injured worker, demonstrate a lack of empathy and understanding of the seriousness of the situation.
5. Blame Shifting: The WM attempted to shift the blame entirely onto the FLT driver for the accident, without acknowledging potential shortcomings in safety protocols or training. This approach does not reflect a commitment to a fair and thorough investigation of incidents.
6. Resistance to Worker Input: The WM resisted worker-demanded meetings and expressed a reluctance to allow employees to voice concerns, suggesting a lack of willingness to engage with workers on safety matters.
7. Lack of Safety Oversight: The WM allowed critical safety issues, such as the absence of painted traffic lines separating pedestrian paths from forklift routes, to persist without corrective action. This shows a lack of proactive safety oversight and risk assessment.
8. Failure to Ensure Adequate Training: The WM did not ensure that employees, such as the FLT driver, received proper training before performing tasks that require specific skills and knowledge. This oversight can result in unsafe work practices.
9. Resistance to Employee Training: Refusing to grant employees, such as supervisors, time off for NEBOSH qualification training indicates a lack of support for employee development and competence in safety matters.
10. Negative Reaction to Worker Demands: The WM's negative reaction to worker demands for change and improvements in safety practices, including the hiring of a health and safety consultant, demonstrates resistance to input from employees who are seeking to improve safety conditions.
11. Focus on Reputation Over Safety: The WM's muttering about not letting their reputation for keeping the warehouse ahead of schedule be ruined, even at the expense of safety, suggests a prioritization of business performance over employee safety.
12. Insensitive Remarks: Making insensitive remarks about the injured worker and questioning the importance of a worker-demanded meeting further illustrates a lack of empathy and understanding of the gravity of safety incidents.
13. Lack of Engagement: The WM's absence from safety-related discussions and their reluctance to engage with safety concerns conveyed a disconnect between management and the workforce regarding safety priorities.
14. Blaming Individuals Instead of Systemic Issues: By solely blaming the FLT driver for the accident and not considering potential systemic issues or safety deficiencies, the WM missed an opportunity to address root causes and improve safety practices.
15. No Demonstrated Commitment to Continuous Improvement: There is no evidence in the scenario that the WM has taken steps to implement continuous improvement in safety practices or to learn from previous incidents.